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THE DIVERGING EFFECTS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE ON THE
EXPECTED DURATION OF JOB SEARCH
Coen N. TEUIINGS
AbstraCt
Efficiency wage theories of the labour market sugpesl that for a variety of reasons ditferent groups of
job seekers are not all affected in the same way by fqictuatbns in labour demand. Two testable
predictions can be derived from those theories: first, the probadlity of finding a job will be atteded
more seriousy for bw qualified than lor highly quaNfied 'pb seekers, because the forrner cannot apply
for bwer ranked jobs. Secondly, job seekers of equal qualification wi0 get better jobs in tight labour
markets.
t3oth predictions are tested tor the Dutch economy during the period 1987-19ti5. Individual transitbn
rates from job search to employmerM are estimated. In a secorxJ model empbyment is class'rfied by
occupatan to indicate the level of the job. Because explanatory variables on the aggregate and the
individual level are combined, standard errors are nomtally underestimated. A method, similar to the
two-error camponent model, is worked out to cope with this problem.
Estimatbn resuRs show both pheramena to be relevant, with non-natives being the major vidims of
the increased selectivity of the market process.
1 INTRODUCTION
Efficiency wage theories of the labour market suggest that there is a discontirwity in wage fomiatbn. ~1
As bng as the market Gearing wage is above a certain minimum level it is equal to the aclual wage rate.
In this case the wage rate can adjust more or less freely to shocks to the economy so as to maintain full
empbyment. However, if market clearing requires a wage rate bebw this minimum, the economy will
suffer unempbyment. Shocks will be adjusted to by movements, rat of relative prices, but of the level
of empbymeM. The wage level at which the economy switches over from price to quantity adjustment
is the efficiency wage. It is the bwest wage profitable for empbyers to offer. Lower wages will lead to
an increased wage bill due to a fall in labour pn~ductivity.21
If wages are restricted by the etticiency wage type of constraints then jobs are ratàned: relative wages
cannot pertorm their task of albcatirg workers to jobs completely. Employers can use criteria other
than the minimumcost per efficiency unit of labourto deterrnine which job seekers are to be hired.
~ E.g. Wefss (1980).
z For a review oi etticiencywage type of nqdels, see Yellen (1984).2
For example, employers may dislice to empby ran-natNes. In a tight labour market wih wages being
market clearirg, empbyers are kept from expressing this shared preterence because the wages of
non-natives wiW faU. TFwse employers whose discrirt~inatory prelerences are ihe weakest wdl empby
non-naHves and thereby gain a competftive advantage. If wages are prevented from falting by
eHiciency wages, then this mechanlsm breaks down. Employers can seled the natives from the pool
of job seekers wflhout havirg to pay surplus wages. Discriminatfon is costless in the case of excess
gupply31
There are other meChanisms in eHicienCy wages nadels whiCh Iead to rromparable resuRs. Weissal
suggesis groups of )ob seekers havirg divergirq eHicienq wages per unil of eHective labour. When
labour demand fatls, those wrth the hphest eHk~ency wage are the first to be laki ott. Akerbf and
Yellerrst suggest that k is not the wage level but the diHerence between high and bw pay wilhin the
same organisatbn which aHeCts productivity. This imposes a minimum restriction only on the bwesl
wages. Therefore with excess supply, employment is ratbned for bw qualified workers abne.
These models are similar to Thurow's job oompetitbn modelsl and to some aspects of ihe dual labour
market hypothesis. There workers do not compete for the highest wage but for the best job. An
increased rationing of hgh ranked )obs induces highly qualHied workers to accept lower ranked jobs,
thereby pushing bwer qualified workers oul of the market. The merit oi eHicfency wage theories
compared to Thurow's model is that they oHer ezplanations forwages being inllex~ble.
Concenlrating on the process of job search two testable implications can be derived from these ideas.
First, eHiciency wage theories suggest that qclical variations in market cond'Rions do rat atfect the
expeded duration of search for all job seekers in the same way. Non-natives in particular will be
aHeded more serbusly, because employers can express their disCriminatory teelings without cost
during the downswing. But also the bwer qualified will suffer rrqre serious consequences o( the cycle,
because empbyers prefer higher qualiiled job seekers. Wilh rationing of jobs this preterence is
costless, too.
Secondly, during the downswing job seekers wilh given characteristics like age, sctaoling, and labour
market experlence, will get bwer ranked jobs ihan they get during the upswing of the cycle. The
increased rationing bbcks the entrance to jobs which were open to them when the labour market was
more fight. Therefore, they are forced to accept bwer ranked jobs.
The purpose oi this paper is to establish both phenomena empirically. The deterioratbn of labour
market condilions in the beginning of the eighties offers the opportunity to do this. In this paper the
Dutch experience is examined. Unempbyment in the Netherlands has risen from 9.2~o in 1981 to
15.0~ in 1983. This variation must be sufficient to identify both phenomena.
Yellen (1984).
weiss (1980).
Akerbf and Yellen (1988).
Thurow (1972).3
I use micro data on job search activrties belween 1981 and 1985, which are obtained from a rarxfom
sample of Dulch households. Wilh these data the probabilRies of Hnding a job can be estimated for
varáus labour markets. These pn be used to diedc the dakn thal the prospeds of the least qualrfied
job seekers are more serbuóly alfeded by the cyde than thoss of better qualilied )ob seekers.
Moreover, the data albw for a dassification of jobs by ocwpatbn. These data can be used to analyse
the alk~catbn ot )obs of differenl grades to job seekers. TtNs enables me to search tor the presence of
the second phenomeran.
In Section 2, I sketch the anaytical framework. This framework is based on rotbns from search theory
and duratbn models. irderence is based on individual transkbn rates from job search to employment
under various labour market conditions.
In Section 3 the estimatbn procedure will be set out. Our data do not albw for the application ot
standard methods, so I have to devise a mettwd to soNe these problems. Furthermore, I shall argue
that if explanatory variables on both the aggregate and the individual level are combined, standard
errors ot the variables on the aggregate level are underrated. I propose a specHication and an
estimation procedure to cope wkh ihis problem.
In Sedion 4 and 5 I discuss the empirical resutts: first the prospects of finding a job in general and
secondy the probabiliUes by occupation are presented.
2 THE MODEL
The probability a job seeker will find a job during the next short interval of time et can be written as:




t - the time spenl on searching up till the moment ot observation (the incomplete duration of
search);
t' - the time spent on searching until ihe moment when the iob seeker finds a job (the
complete duratbn);
F(.),f(.) - respedively, the distribution and the density function of t'.
x(t) is called the transAàn or hazard rate of job search to employmenl. The interval At is diosen so that
the probability i tinds Mro jobs within this interval can be ignored.
As is welEknown, F(.) and f(.) are described by:
F(t) - 1- exp(-j.l(s)dsj (ta)
l o J4
,(r, - x(r,exp(-J x~s,dsl (~b)
lo J
The expeded completed duratán of search can be calailated irom:
r
E(t~) - J f.,(t) dt - J exp -J x(s,ds dt
n u o
(2)
where the tinal step follows irom integration by parts. In general A(t) will vary among individuals and
during the elapsed duratan of search t.n Because 7~(q has to be positive by definition, it is convenient
to use an exponential specitication. Furthermore I assume the etteds ot t and of the characteristics of
the individual to be muRiplicatively separable. This nadel is krawn as the proportional hazard model:sl
Z~(t) - D(f)BxP(Xi~~ - Ytr-' exP~X~~) (3)
where:
x; a a vedor of charaderistics ot individual i
~. a vedor of parameters describing !he effed of each charaderistic on the transitán rate.
The final expression in (3) constitutes a cornenienl spec'rficatán of g(.), which wlll be used throughout
the paper. Thls is the basic framework, which has been used in many other papers on labour market
dynamics. Two further elaborations have to be made in order to apply it to the problem in hand.
First, theway cyclical variations affed the transition rate has to be modelled. For expositional purposes
I assume temporarily that the effects ot personal characteristics and of the incomplete duration ot
sean;h on the hazard rate can be negleded: ~;(t) -~
Assume the search process on the labour market can be descríbed with a Cobb-lbuglas production
function:
MTdr . C. U~ . V~dr (4)
i Since Lancaster's paper (1979) a bt of atterttán has been paid to the role of unobserved hetero-
geneity. Unobserved heterogeneity can be expeded to bias the estimate of the effed of t mainly.
As will be discussed in Sedion 3, I cannot even identify the effed of t with the available data.
Therefore, I shall not conslder the possibilRy of unobserved heterogeneity among individuals in
the sequel.
B Amemrya (1985), p. 449.5
where:
UT - the stodc of job seekers at time T
V~ . the Stodc d vacanCies at time t
M~ - ihe rate d matches beriveen job seekers andvacancies attime t
and where t derqtes calendar time.
This concept is krwwn as the match produdion functbn?i R reflects the fact ihat for a fbw of matches
to be realised, stodcs of vacancfes as well as job seekers are indispensable. The more one of the
9adors d productbn' Is available, the more malches can be reaNSed.
In the sequel the search process is assumed to be characterised by constaM retums to scale: e t S 3
7.~01 Now we can ask what the transitán rate of job search lo empbymeM will be inihis labour market.
For reason of our temporarily slmplHying assumptions (homogeneous job seekers, no time
dependence) the following relatbn hokis:
M,dz . Utx,dr (5)
Atter inserting (5) in (4) and some rearrangemerrt one gets:
Ái - C~u` I (6)
The transition rate appears to be a funatbn of the number oi vacancies divided by the number ot job
seekers. The simple form clearly depends on the choice of the Cobb-Douglas function, but for any
production function exhibiting constant returns to scale the transition rate depends on ihe ralio oi
vacancies and unempbymeM.
Equation (6) is a justHication for capturing the ettect oi cyclical variations on the transitbn rate by ihe
ratio of vacancies and job seekers. This conclusbn does not hinge on the assumption 1~ being
independent of the incomplete duration of search. Using results discussed in sectán 3 it can be
shown ihat under some stationarity assumptbns ihis conclusbn remains valid if this assumption is
relaxed. However, if 7~ is albwed to depend on x;, equation 6 is no bnger valid. Not only does the
number of job seekers matter, but also the composftbn of its stodc. I leave all these complicatbns tor
what they are. The discussbn above is meant to give some idea of how this spec'rficatbn relates to a
more general model of the labour market.
9 Pissarides (198~, see Bekierbos and 7eulings (1990) for a further expositbn on this subjed.
~o Some evidence for this assumption can be tourxl in Belderbos and Teulings (1990).6
Now the purpose of the analysis is to test wttether S has the same value tor all job seekers. Our
hypothesis is ihat non-natives and bwer qualified job seekers face a higher S then others. Therefore I
albw S to be a linear tunctán ot some elemerqs of x;, say:
S - x,a
where s; ~ a vedor wilh ihe elements beirq a subset of the elemerNS of x; and a is a parameter vector
with corresporá'ing dimension. To facilitate notation we drop lhe index for calendar time t in the
sequel. To Identify S we need variation of the ratá ol the numbers of vacancies and job seekers.
Therefore I introduce a subscxipt k denoting labour markets, each fadng its own ratb ot vacandes and
job seekers. I assume a job seeker can oNy operate at one labour market in a time.
trombining (3) and (6) resutls iMo:
xr~(f) - 9(f)exPlziQ)I U~Q - 9lf)exP~Xid t9kXia~ (~
` k
where 1 wrAe qk in stead Of In (VkIU;~.
It will be a central issue in this paper to establish elements of a other than the inlercept being unequal
to zero. Estimatàn resuRs for equatàn (7) are presented in sedion 4.
The second elaboration concerns the heterogeneity of jobs within a labour market. Jobs can be
categorized aocording to their occupatán. Therefore, the job search process can be characterised not
by just one but by more transitán rates, one for every occupatàn. Assume the transition rate ot
individual i to oaxipation j after a spell of lengtht of unsuccessful searoh equals:
x~p~f) - 9~f)exP~X~~f t 9kaj t 9kX;a~
(8)
The speáficatán in (8) irnolves three assumptáns.
First, g(.) is assumed to be independent of j implying that the duration deperxlence o( the transitàn
rates is the same (or all occupatàns. This assumption enables an attractive decon~osition of the
model, which fs discussed bekrnr. I have not Irnestigated the consequences of this assumptàn any
further. With the data at hand it seems hardly possible to derive testable implications from this
assumptán.
Secondly, qo is not indexed for oocupatàns. For Vk this seems to be countertactual. The introductàn
of occupatàns in the model was meant to account for the heterogeneity of vacancies. Therefore it
seems natural to distinguish vacancies by occupation. Data for the number of vacancies per
occupation are indeed available, but inspectàn of these data reveals them to be not very realistic.7
Earlier research has shown that using V~j rather than Vk does not aHed the transftion rates by
occupatbn signdicantly. ~~) Therefore I have decided not to use these data here.
Thirdy, ony ao is albwed to vary over j. This is a pucial asped ot ihe nadel. I intend to show that,
given z;, the iransftion rates to hipherranked occupafbns are more sensllive to changing labour market
conditbns than the rates to bwer ranked oocupatbns: a)ob seeker who finds his opportunities to get
a first rank job bbdced by increased ratbning, wiN revise his sVategy by acceptirq seoond rank jobs
too.
To capture this idea only the coefliGenl tor produd of qk and ihe intercept has to vary over
ocwpatbns. The coetficients for the produd of other elements of ~; (apart from the interoept) and qk
are assumed to have same value for all occupatbns, for the data contain insuHiGeM information to
identify them all separatey.
The total transRion rate of job search to empbyment equals the sum ot the transition rates by
occupation:
xrk(t) - ~Zy~(t) - 9(t)~exP~xr~~ t qk~j } qkr~~ (9)
! I
In thiscase~; does not contain a constant tor reasons stated above.
The distribution of completed duratbns of search F(.) and thus the expeded duration o1 search are
solely determined by this total transition rate. Its decomposition by occupatfon does not aflect ihe
distributbn of completed duratbns.
The probabilily that a job seekerwho finds a job will tind this job in occupatbn j equals:
Pr(i finds a job in j at t~ i finds a job at t) - Z~` (t ) - exp( zr~~ t qkaj ó qk ~ra) (10)
Z;u,(t) - exp(xrr9i t qkar t qrxia)
t e
Here the advantage ol g(.) being independent of j becomes clear: ihe probability described in (10)
does not depend on the value ol t. Further inspedbn shows this probability to be described by a
muftiramiai bgit nadel, which has been analysed thoroughly inthe literature.1zl
Estimation resultsfor equation (8) are presented in sedion 5.
t~ Teulings (1990), page 136.
1z e.g. Amemiya (1985), page 295.8
3 ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
Nomtally, duration models are estimated using panel data. The ideal set-up invoNes data on a group of
people aA starting to search on the same date. After some period o1 time ihis group is interviewed
again, which resuRs in intonnatbn about the completed duration of search of those who succeeded in
finding a job. Using (ta) and (1b) a licelihood functfon can be easWy wrilten.
I postpone a general discussfon ot the data unt11 the next section, but to understand the sequei it must
be noted ihat no panel data were available. However, a retrospeàive quesibn albws for ident'rficatán
ot those persons who found a job during ihe year precedinp the date of 'witerview.131 Furtherrnore it is
also known q the respondeM is searching lor a job at the date of interview. This gives us inforrnation on
two variables, namely the fbw of people finding a job during the last year and the stock of people
searching. In the sequel I show how to use this informatbn to estimate the expected duration of job
search ortransition rates of search to empbyment.
The densily of a job seeker who is presenlly searching to have started search at time - t is:~41
Pr(started searching at - t ~ still searching at 0) s
Pr(t' 2 t ~ started searching at - t)Pr(started searching at - t)
J Pr(r' t s( started searching at - s)Pr(started searchirq at - s)ds
0
This expression can be greatty simpli(ied ' A one is prepared to make two statánarity assumptions.
The first assumptbn is that ihe transition rate does not depend on the moment when the search
activities s1aA. This does not rule out the possibility of duration dependence (compare Seclbn 2). This
assumptán leads Pr(Y~ t ~ started sear~hing at -t) to be equal to Pr(t' ~ t). So, the condRbning in the
numerator and the denominator in (11) can be left out.
13 This can be done by a comparison of the answer to the questions 'principal occupation?' (e.g.
working, study, unemployed, disabled, working in own househoki) and 'principal occupation a
year ago'.
One can ask why this inlortnation cannot be used to esiimate transilion rates by boking at which
people, wta were unempbyed a year belore, had found a job a year later. Basicalty there are two
problems connecled to this approach. First, anatysis of the data shows unempbymerri being oniy
partialty reported in the retrospective question, probably because many unempbyment spells last
tor onty a short perbd. Secondty, befng unemployed is not ihe same as searching for a job. The
latter is the relevarrt variable.
Kooreman and Ridder (1983). ia9
Secondy, I assume the probability of starting search to be constant over time. This causes the second
part ol the numerator and the denominator of (11) to be equal, so that they can be left out. Under
these assumptáns (11) simpldies to:
Pr (started searching at - t ~ still searchirp at 0) --
Pr~t' 2 t - t- F(t) (72)
j Pr~t' 2 s~ds
E~t'~
0
lb these assumptáns hamper the valid'Ay of the estimatán resufts seriousy? In general the shorter
the average spell of job search, the less seráus are its consequences. This is because the statánardy
assumptions need ony to hokl tor the time needed to enable the majority of the job seekers to find a
job. Most job search spells are rather short. The assumptáns will have the most serious consequen-
ces for the estimatán resutls for 1983: firstly, the average duratán of search was very high in that year
and secondy, in the period betore labour market cond'Aions were deteriorating rapidy. In general the
assumptbns will not affed the validity of the resulls seriousy.~sl
Now the rate of people finding a job M, given the stock of job seekers U, can be derived by
multiplication of the probability that a job seeker has been searching for a period t and the
corresponding transitán rate:
M~dr - U, j x(s) f-~~ ds - U~dr 1 E(t' )
o E(t )
(13)
After rearrangement equation (13) states that the expected completed duration ot search is the
number ot job seekers divided by the rate of job seekers finding a job. This expression is the starting
point for estimation.
To get better insight into what this procedure actually means, E(t') has to be calculated using equation
(2). First considerthe case where no occupatáns are distinguished:
E~t'~ - J expl - J ysr-'exP~z;q~dsJ
dt - J exp~-trexP(Zrq)~dt ~
o lo 0
. v r l
- !u'~r-'exp~-z~q~ rexp(-u)du - exPl - ~ Zrq }
AJ o ll r (14)
15 See Bekierbos and Teulings (1990) tor a more detailed anaysis of these problems.10
where:
A- In{T(1 I y) I y}
ZJ - [xl ~ Qk Xl,
e-[~;a]
For the third step a change of variable is applied: u- exp (z;6)tY. For cornenience I suppress the
subscript k in the ratatbn of z;.
Assume a sample including the stodc of job seekers and the fbw ot people having found a job during
the past period (i.e. the year preceding the date ot observatbn). As a tirst order approximation we can
use (13) for estimating this Ilow. The corWilional probability that an individual in this sample belongs to
the fbw of peopls findirg a job is:
exp~~ iJB - A~
Pf~ÍE:~f~IE(Jv1EM~- y
1 t exp ~ iJ6 - A
r
(15)
where U and M represent the sets ot job seekers and those who found a job respectively. For
convenience I dropthe index of calendartime again.
Equation (15) is the well-known binomial bgit model. So, the expected duration of search can be
estimated by applyirg a IogR model to the sample described before. The estimated coetticients
measure 91y, except tor the coetticient of the constant, which has to be corrected by adding A. By (14)
these coefficienis can be interpreted as minus the relative ettect of ihe variables in x; on the expected
duration of job search. This procedure will be applied in seclàn 4.
We now turn our attention to the case where jobs are distinguished by occupation. By a similar
argument as tor the case wíth homogeneous vacancies and by equatán (10) the conditbnal probabili-
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where Mj representsthe set of those who found a job in oocupatbn j.
Equatbn (16) is McFadden's nested bgit nwdeL ~sl tl y~1 the nwdel reduces to a simple nwUiramial
bgit model. Nested bgit models can be estimated either by maximum likelihood or by using a two-
stage method: first estimate the model described by equation (10) using maximum licelihood. This
gives eslimates for ~- 9~ for all j except j.1. The tirst occupatbn is used as the berrchmark. Next,
impute these coefficients in a model describing Pr(ieM ~ ieU vieM) and estimate the remaining
coefficients with maximum Ukelihood.
As wiU be described in Sectbn 5 I do rat use a full set of ocaipatbns, so that procedure outlined
above canrwt be applied. Therelore y is assumed to be equal to unily, so that equatbn (16) reduces
to the muftinomial bgit model. Note that the caefticieMs ~ can no brper be interpreted as minus the
relative eftecls on the expected duration of job search, because this duratbn depends soley on the
total transitbn rate. Therefore I have to resort to the interpretation o1 the coefficients as the relative
efleqs on the trans8bn rate by oocupatbn.
Parameter estimates forthis model are presented in seclion 5.
Betore tuming to the eslimatbn results, one problem has to be discussed more deeply. In the models
described by the equations (3) and (8) two kinds of eftects are involved. The transilion rates are
attected firstly by personal charaderistics and secondly by labour market conditbns. The latter are
identical for all job seekers who operate on the same markeL So the job seekers in the dataset can be
divided in a limited numberof groups according to the labour market they belong to. WUhin a group
labour market cond'Abns are by definUion the same.
The assumptbn in the present specification of the model is that qk measures all the differences
between labour markets: there are no other relevant variables, which are not included in the model.
The stochastic nature of the model solely rellects the unpredictability of individual behaviour, not
urabserved heterogeneity among labour markets.
A model that albws for this kind of unobserved heterogeneRy would include a labour market specific
error term, that is, an error term wilh the same value for all individuals within a market. This model is
anabgous to the two-error components models used in panel data anaysis.~~ For every observatbn
on individual i at time tthere are two Stochastic components: thefirst covering urwbserved charaderis-
tics which vary over i but not over t, the second covering unobserved charaderistics varying over i and
t. Labour markets compare to individuals, and job seekers to moments of time in lhe two-error
components model. Note however, that the assymptotic teatures are different here because normally
the number of observation is large forthe tonnerand small for the latter, while here it is the other way
around.
The omission of a labour market specUic error terrn can be expected to induce underestimation of the
variance of the parameters forthe variables measuring market condUions. This can be seen by conside-
~s McFadden (1981).
~~ Amem'rya (1985), page 211.iz
ring an extreme example: suppose our dataset oorNains onlytwo markets and suppose the probabili-
ties of finding a job differ sigrrficanty n both ngrkets, Uiat is, a durrmy for market 2con~pared to marke!
1 proves to be signifbant. Now any variable with diHererrt valuea for both markets would produce
exactly the same t-value (in absolute valua), whether it be the number ot vacancies per job seeker or
cumulative rainfaW.
The main problem is that ihe emor terms for each ktdNidual are inoorrecty perceived as independent,
while wRhin a market they are correlated due to the unobserved Component of market conditions.~s1
To soNe this problem the rtadel has to albw br this urabserved heterogeneRy:
ZMt ~ f)' g~ t) exP( X!Y t Qk xl a f JVk) (17)
where the index k indicates the labour market and where vk is an error term which is distributed as
N(O,E). Note that nadel (17) reduces to equatbn (7) if E is equal to zero. This model can be estimated
using a simple two-stage procedure. First, estimate the folbwirq model:
xW~f)-9~f)exP(Xriq tX~ak) (18)
Equatbn (18) implies a separate vector ak to be estimated for every labour market. To avoid the
dummy trap, the variables induded in ~; must be lett out of x; in this case. The symbol' for x; and ~ is
used to indicate this (so x;' is the complement of ~; with respect to z;). By (15) this model is equivalent
to a binomial bgit model.
Nowwe Can write down the folbwing:
Qk -Qka t~tVk t Wk (~9)
where the symbol " above a parameter derates its estimator, wk represents the error invoNed in the
estimatbn of ak, and where ~ represents the elemenls of ~ that correspond to the variables in ~; (j}
being the complement of ~').
lk~e to the consistency of the maximum likelihood estimates of a bgit model the expedation ot wk 's
asymptoticaly equal to zero. An estimate of the covariance matrix of wk resulls from the estimation of
the bgil model (18). Model (19) is a simple system of linear equations wdh the vedor a and j} as
unkrawn parameters. Consistent estimates ol a and ~ are obtained by applying FGIS to (19): the tirst
equatíon (19) is estimated with OLS to obtain an estimate of L This estimate can be used to cabulate
78 This problem has moregeneral impoRance. Any model usirg explanatory variables which have the
same value for predetined subsets of the full set ol observations sufter this problem e.g.
Lancaster (1979).13
the covarfance matrix of vk t wk. Next we use thfs oovarlance matroc to estimate (19) with GLS. This
procedure is described in more detail in the Appendix.
The method albws for the test of lhe restriCtion E: p, n tMs restrictpn cannot be rejected, all relevant
variation between labour markets is covered by q~. In that case one can safely retum to the more
simple model (~. A practical approach is ro n~e that nwdel (~ Is nested in modet (ta). The test E~ o is
equivalerp to ihe test of model (7) agair~st rtadel (ta); the fonner can be maintained U all vk are equal to
zero. For this purpose the IikeAhood ratb test can be used.
There are two limits to the appNCability of this iwo-stage method. The first is the number of labour
markets to be distinguished. Too many markets would increase the number of regressors in model
(18) beyondwhat is manageable. The second is the number of obsen,ations per labour market. It ihere
are too few observations the estlmate of the covariance matriu ot wk is unreliable.
Mutatis mutandis this proCedure can also be applied to the model with oa.upation spec'rfic transition
rates. However, here the pn~blem ot the large number of regressors is acute, because it rises linearly
with the number ot oocupatbns. To solve ihis problem I use the oonvenient feature of multinomial bgit
models whiCh is that ihey can be deoomposed irrio subnadels, whioh are themselves bgrt models:19)
Pr~i e M~~i e U v i E M~~ exp~i;Bi~ Pr~Í E Mi~i E U V 1 E Mi~ - -
Pr(Í E U V I E Mi~ i E U V I e M~ - 1 t exp~7~6i ~
(20)
However, the number ol observations per labour market relating to finding a job in a specific occupa-
tion is in many Cases rather small. AS noted qefore this leads to problems in the estimation of E.
Therefore, I appy this method only to aj and not to a.
A large number of observations is available. To reduce computation costs I do not use all of them for
estimatbn. Keeping the total number of observations fixed, the parameter estimates o( bgit models
are most reliable if the observatáns are divided nare or less equaly over the alternatives. During the
period 1981-1985 job seekers outnumbered by far those who lound a ~ob. So to reduce ihe number
ol observations wkh the minimum bss of reliabilRy of the parameter estimates the best one can do is to
include ony paR of the job seekers. Here arather practical feature ot bgA models can be used:~l
~ Hausman and McFadden (1984).
~ Manski and Lerman (1977).14
Pr(l E M ~ I E U V I E M)Pr~! E U~ V 1 E M ~ i E U V I E M~
Pf(l E M ~ Í E (1 V 1 E M) - -
PrÍEU~VÍEM~ÍEUVJEM
exp i~q~ t In(p)
- 1 t exP~z~q~ t In(P)
(21)
where U' Is lhe aet ol )ob aeekera uaed tor eatlrtiatbn end p M the probabllMy-that a job seeker Is
included in U'.
Equation (21) implies that if an aftemative Is under-represented in the sample all parameter estimates
derived irom maximum IAcelihood estimation remain consisterà, except tor ihe intercept. The intercept
can be corrected easily by substraàirp In(p). In ourcase p tor job seekers is 50'~0.
4 RESULTS: GENERAL MODEL
The dataset I use is the ArbeidsKrachten Telling AKT (Labour Market Survey) of the Dutch Ceniral
Bureau of Statistics. This survey is based on Inlerv'iews of a 1-5 96 sample of the total population of the
CouMry. The AKT was organised every two years up till 1985. Here the resuRs tor 1981, 1983 and
1985 are used. The editions betore 1981 could not be used, because data on the number of
vacancies were available only irom 1980. These data are derived from a survey of enterprises also
organised by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The Labour Exchange also produces data on the
rwmber of vacancies and k staRed to do so brg betore 1980, but these figures are known to be un-
rellable. Earlier research revealed that they do not 1it the model because the registratbn rate of
vacarxies faNS in the course ot time.211
To analyse the eflects of labour market condilbns the data must Cover as many markets as possible, in
any case more than three (1981, 1983, and 1985). To increase variation markets are classified by
region. Regional market conditbns vary a lot in the Netherlands, the west experiencing a more tight
labour market than the south and the noRh. For each year the market is divided into five regional
markets, so together 15 markets are distinguished. To give some idea of the variation, the ratios of
numbers of pb seekers and vacancies are listed in Table 1. Earlier research has shown that these
markets are almost perfectly separated, except for the higher vocational and the unlversity level ot
educatàn.22t Theretore, these are IeR out o1 the anaysis.
~ Belderbos and Teulings (1990).
a Teulings and Koopmanschap (1989).15
The analysis includes job-seekers having a job, but only il they are forced to look for another job
because they expect to be dismissed in the near fulure. I qA ttrs hvoluntary job search, in contrast to
volunlary search. Irnoluntary search can be distirquished from voluntary search by the questions
'reason tor looking for a job?' (tor job-seekers) or 'reason br leavinp your former job7 (tor those who
found a job duringthe last year). The motivation to keep out volunlary searoh fnxn the anaysis is that R
is not sure that the nwdel can be applied to this. Many per~ons wiN have tound their new job without
any search at all, simply because they were asked to appry by thelr new employer. In ihat case the
notbn of a transilbn-rate irom search to a newJob does not make sense.
Table 1 The numbers of vacancies per jobyeeker by labour market
Regbn' 1981 1983 1985
Norih 0.061 0.019 0.029
East 0.079 0.019 0.050
North West 0.172 0.048 0.098
South West 0.203 0.033 0.086
South 0.082 0.023 0.047
' N: Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe
E: Overijssel, Geldertand
NW: Utrecht, Flevoland, North-Holland
SW: South-Holland, Zeeland
S: Brabant, Limburg
Furthennore, I leave out ail persons finding or boking for a job ol less then 15 hours or a job as setf-
empbyed. The labour market for these jobs operates in asubstantfalydifferent way. Trying to start up
your own finn can hardly be compared to trying to get hired by an employer. For small jobs tumover
rates are high, which leads to substantial measurement errors.
Finally, the analysis is resiricted to persons aged below 45 years. The reason forthis is that schooling
variables have to play an importanl role in the explanatbn of transitbn rates. The spread of secondary
educatbn among broader classes of society has increased tremendously since World War II.
Moreover, nowadays sChoolirq is of ~ greater fmportance br achievirq an attradive posilion. Both
faclon3 make it hard to compare the degree of educatbn o1 a 50 year old pen3on with that of a 30 years
younger entrarrt. Anyway, the Chances of findirq e job for people above the age o1 45 were negligitNe
durirg the period under consideratbn.
Table 2 contains the parameter estimates tor the expected duration of )ob search betore finding a job.
AS lolbws from ec~ation (14) ihe parameters indicate the relative increase in the expeded duratbn ot
job searchdue to a unil increase in ihe explanatory variable.16
Table 2 Estimatbn results for the expeded duratbn ol job search
urabserved heterogeneity between markets: wittwut with
variable coettblent (st. err) coetticient (st. err)
intercept~l 1.37 0.064 1.44 0.08741
level 01 educatior~l -0.37 0.031 -0.31 0.03941
diredbn of educatbn (compared to generap
- educatbnai 0.01 0.18 -0.14 0.18
- ~a~uKurai -0.55 0.13 -0.49 0.14
- technfcal -0.39 0.055 -0.32 0.060
- transpoA -0.40 0.23 -0.40 0.24
- medical -0.84 0.12 -0.80 0.12
- ecoramic -0.55 0.072 -0.57 0.073
- socia~cutlurai -0.34 0.24 -0.50 0.24
- care -0.25 0.065 -0.21 0.067
age (except for second entry)s1 0.33 0.040 0.30 0.040
age (second entry)51 -0.049 0.086 -0.034 0.087
labour market positbn
(compared to dismissed)
- entrant -0.62 0.050 -0.65 0.050
- secorW entry 1.09 0.18 1.06 0.18
sex by compositbn of the househoki
(con~ared to man, single)
- man, non-single -0.48 0.064 -0.51 0.064
- woman, non-single -0.12 0.080 -0.12 0.081
- woman, sinple 0.15 0.055 0.16 0.056
non-native 0.87 0.13 0.91 0.2241
In (vacancieslpb seekers)3~ -0.41 0.049 -0.39 0.0964~
idem by level of educatbn2la) 0.016 0.035 -0.009 0.095di
idem by non-native3l -0.51 0.15 -0.45 0.294~
bg likelihood -8154.60 -8117.23
number of variables in bgit mociel 21 ó0si
number of observatbns 12807 12807
1) corrected for endogerwus sampling
2) value: 0- basic; 1- extended basic: 2 - intemiediate
3) measured in deviatbns Irom their mean over labour markets (-2.915)
4) based on FGLS
5) (age minus 15)I10; age in years
6) in the bgit nadelAs could be expeded, the higher the education level attained, the quidcer a job seeker finds a job.
However, the coetticients show that a proper choice of the diredbn of educatbn is even more
important than reaching the highest possible level. In general vocatbnal training is a better option than
leaving school with ony general educatbn, except for traininp to become a teacher. This exception
can be ascribed to dertwgraphic reasons. The high coeBicient for mediral educatbn reflects the big
shortage of nurses in the Netherlands. This problem Is mainy due to the bw pay for this occupation
and N is stiN largey unsolved.
I distlrguish between three types of labour market experience: those enlering the labour market, job
seekers who are dismissed or fear to be so in the near feature, and job seekers who re-enter the
market after an intenuptbn o1 a bnger period. The latter are mainy women who have been taking care
ol their children and are now trying to get a job again. I have separated the eflect of age forthls group,
because it can be expected that being older is rat that much of a disadvantage tor this group.
Empbyers accept taking care of the chiWren as a reasonable explanation for not beirq empbyed.
The estimation resufts confirm this idea: being aged is a serious disadvantage for entrants and
dismissed persons, while for re-entrants age does not affect the expecled duratbn of search that
much. Note that the dummies tor being an entrant or a re-entrant measure the elleds of the labour
market position at the age of fifteen. Because the prospeds of laid-0H persons to get a job deteriorate
with age, the difference between this group and re-entrants gradually disappears. Taking into accóunt
the coetticients for age, fl is better for a job seeker to be a re-eMrarrt rather than to qe laid ott when he
or she is okier than 44.
Sex as such does not affect the expected duration o( search that much. However, being a single male
gives a substantialy higher expected duration of search. Similar resuRs can be found for income:
single maies eam less than their manied colleagues.~t Meyer and Wise attribute this resull to the fact
that in most Cases married males have to eam the whole o1 the tausehold income, while singles only
have to take care of themselves. Probably a more likely explanatbn of this phenomenon is seH-
selec:tion: success on the partner market and on the labour market are correlated. Our data give some
weak evidence tor this supposition: singles get bwer ranked jobs than those having a partner.
Moreover, their duratbn of search seems to be more seriousy affeded by the cycle.
We now tum our attention to the main point of interest: the variables reflecting labour market
condilbns. For transparancy I have measuredthe ettect In(vacanáes perjob seeker) in deviations irom
its mean over labour markets. This albws us to interpret the coefficients for non-nat'rveness and for the
level of education as the ettects in the 'average' labour market; this procedure does rat aftect the
coefticieMs for the ettect ot labour market condNions.
First, the number of vacancies per job seeker proves to be highy significant. The value of the
coetticient is somewhere between zero and unity as would be expecled theoretically. For a 1 percent
a Meyer and Wise (1983), Didcens and Larp (1985).18
increase in the number of vacancies per job seeker, the expected duration of search faNs by approx
0.4 percent.
As set out in the Iniroduction, the eHect of market cordittbrrs on the duration of search is expected to
be hipher tor non-natives and lower educated job seekeB. The estknatfon resuKs reveal that the effect
ot market conditions do rat vary signKicantly wilh education level. However, market conditions do
attect the relative position ot non-natives. On average the prospeds of non-natives finding a job are
less than of those of natives. During the downswinp this dKference increases substantially: in our
sample the coeflicient for ron-natives varies over labour markets irom -0.20 (regfon SW, 1981) to -
1.40 (region N and E, 1983).
These resutts are a partial confirmationof our first hypothesis that job seekers wilh bwer qualificat'ans
suffer the downswing more seriousy.
For comparison the results tor the estimation method, without accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity between labour markets, are listed in Table 2 next to ihe resutts when unobserved
heten~geneity ot market conditions is alkr~ved for.
The likelihood ratio test shows that ihe restriclion of no unobserved heterogeneity cannot be main-
tained.241 Therefore, alkivrance for iabour market specific error tem~s is necessary. Comparing the
parameter estimates for both methods shows them to be more or less the same. The same is true for
their estimated standard errors, except for the parameters a, which correspond to labour market
specific varlables, and their counlerparts In ~(I.e. ~. This had been expected: introducing labour
market specific error terms accounts tor the fact that the indNiduals within a labour market are not
stochasticly independenl. A comparison of the standard errors shows that this effect must not be
neglecled: the coefticient of the additional eHecl of labour market conditions for non-natives is shown
to be only weakly sign'rficant in this case. The estimate for the covariance matrix of the labour market
spec'rfic error tenns (Z7 is presented in Table 2a.
Table 2a Eslimate of covariarK;e mairix of the labour market spec'rfic error tem~s (~
1 2 3
1. log (vacanciesl'pb seekers) 0.040
2. idem by education level -0.028 0.032
3. idem by non-native -0.031 -0.041 0.398
~ The vak,e of the test statistic is: 2( 8154.60 - 8117.22 ) ~ 74.76 This statistic is disiritwted xz with
fi0 - 21 . 39 degrees ot ireedom. The critical value at 5 9'e significance level is 54.3.19
5 RESULTS: MODEL WITH OCCUPATIONS
In this section I discuss the estimation resutls for a nadel with oocupation spec'rfic transition rates. It is
hardly possible to estimate such a model for the whole labour market simuRaneousy. Even with the
restriction of persons with education above the intermediate level beirg left out of the analysis, a
meaningful classilication of jobs requires ihat at least 30 oocupations are distinguished. The simulta-
neous estimatbn of 30 transition rates, where each rate irnoNes something like 20 coetticients, is a
hard 'pb.
Therefore, only a part of the labour market Is analysed ihat can be separated from the rest of the market
rather easily. I chose the market for technfcal occupations. This choice is party motivated by the
degree of separatán ot the market and partly by the fine categorisation of jobs into occupatbns in
manufacturing compared to services. This fine categorisatbn can be ascribed to Taybrist praclices in
manufacluring. In the model seven occupations are distinguished, mainly reflecting differences in the
degree of schooling or experience needed to perlortn the tasks involved.251
Restricling the anaysis to technical occupatbns implies that the range of job seekers can be narrowed
down too. Only male job seekers who have had training in general or technical directbn are included.
The motivation to include job seekers with general educatfon is that at the basic level only general
education exists. Women are excluded because they seldom lind 'pbs in these occupations. This
reduces the number of variables considerably, because (nearfy) all re-entrants were female too.
The figures in Table 3 give an indication of the degree of separation between the selected occupa-
tions and 'pb seekers and ihe rest of the labour market: 43"~a of the job seekers inctuded in the model
find a job in an occupatbn which is rat inGude, while only 6~0 0l ihe people not included find a job in
an occupation which is included. The figures show the separation to be farfrom perfect.
Table 3 Job seekers distinguished by whether they are included in the model or not and by whether
the oocupation where they find a job is included or not (row percentages)
the occupation where they find a job:
people finding a job: included not included total
included In the model 57 43 49
not included in the model 6 94 51
a This is shown by cluster anatysis of ihe Labour Market Survey of 1981, see Teulings and Vriend
(1988). The classificatbn o( occupatbns stems from this analysis.zo
The resuMs are shown in Table 4. The ranlcinp of occupations in the headings o( the table is done more
or less in aa;ordance wrth the level of required qualifications. 1 used the average level of schooling of
those holdirq a job in the occupation as a proxy for this.
In the table the coefficients ot the transitbn rate are presented instead of those of ihe expected
duration of search, as is done in Table 2. The tonner are the oppostte of the latter. The reason for this
is that in this case the interpretatbn in tenns oi expeded duratbn ol search is rat valid, as lhis duratbn
depends soley on the total transition rate and not on occupatbn spedfic rates.
in this analysis the level d education is considered to be an oniinel irrstead d a card'inal variable. This is
done because fn this rtadel we have to albw br the possibilily that in the iransitbn rate to for example
the occupatbn 'skilled proàictbn worker' (the middle in the rankkq) the extended basic level of
educatbn has a positive effed oompared to the basic as well as to the intemiediate level of education.
The resuhs stress the strong handicap of beirp non-native. In all occupations but one being a non-
native reduces the relevant transition rate. Only for the one but bwest ranked occupation is the
opposRe true. So, according to the results in the tonner sedion, ran-natives have a bwer chance ot
finding a job In general and according to the resuRs in this section, tl they do find a jobthLs is in a bwer
ranked ocwpatlon.
Entrants have higher transitbn rates to all oa.upations as have ron-singles. Ony for unskilled produc-
tbn workers does being singte not affed the transition rate that much. Thls resuft supports to some
extent ihe suppositbn that singles are less attractive to employers than their married colleagues.
Let us now turn to the variabies descnbing labour market cond'Abns. As in Sedion 4 labour market
cond'Aions are measured in deviation irom their mean over labourmarkets.
First ratice that there is a connedion between ihe ranking of the occupation and the effed ot the
numberof vacancies perpb seeker: the effed increases with the required level ot qualificatbns. This
finding is in accordance with the second basic hypothesis of this paper: if labour market conddions
deterbrate, job seekers will tind less attradive jobs than in a tigM labour market. The adverse ranking
ot the coettbients of truck drivers and unskilled produdion workers is probably the result of the
inadequacy ot the average educatbn level as a measure of the ranking ot occupatbns. The high
coefficient for being non-native for unskilled produdion workers strongy suggests that working in this
occ.upatán is less attradive than being a tnfck driver.21
Tabie 4 Estimatàn results for occupatàn-specilà transilàn rates from job seeking to empbyment for
the technical sub-market without urabserved heterogeneity (std. errors in parentheses)
un- skited superv. intermed.
tnxic skiM.prod. constr. prod. elec- prod. technical
drivers workers workers workers tricians workers staff
average educatàn level ot
those employecN) 0.77 0.87 0.90 1.30 1.57 1.67 2.07
intercepi~) -3.28 -3.53 -3.44 -3.36 -7;15 -8.66 -7.75
(0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.16) (0.~8) (0.82) (0.78)
level ot educatàn
- extended basiC -0.67 -0.28 -0.69 -0.80 0.46 -1.41 -1.18
(0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.21) (0.65) (1.04) (0.88)
- intermedlate -1.30 -0.32 -0.96 -0.49 1.14 1.13 2.24
(0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.21) (0.64) (0.93) (0.80)
technical educatàn 1.42 0.88 0.37 2.48 3.01 1.94 2.93
(0.21) (0.22) (0.42) (0.16) (0.40) (0.80) (0.39)
age3) -0.17 -0.57 -0.10 -0.31 -0.62 0.73 -0.26
(0.30) (0.17) (0.13) (0.087) (0.23) (0.26) (0.23)
non-native -0.74 0.53 -1.48 -1.30 -1.19 -0.89 ~
(0.30) (0.27) (0.45) (0.33) (0.75) (1.06)
entrant 0.38 0.69 0.41 0.83 1.55 0.52 1.44
(0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.12) (0.26) (0.69) (0.30)
non-single 0.78 0.11 0.72 0.53 0.78 1.33 0.32
(0.15) (0.22) (0.20) (0.12) (0.27) (0.53) (0.29)
log (vacanciesl 0.35 0.11 0.30 0.53 0.97 0.82 0.90
job seekers)2) (0.096) (0.12) (0.11) (0.094) (0.15) (0.24) (0.18)
generic coetflclents
log (vacancieslpb seekers) by:
- educatàn level 2) 4) -0.11 (0.06)
- idem by ran-native 2) 0.57 (0.23)
log likelihood -5383.08
number of parameters 65
number ot observatàns 4828
traclàn oi the aftemative in
the sample
22
0.040 0.041 0.076 0.154 0.008 0.029 0.0-
1) corrected for endogenous sampling
2) measured in deviatàns from their mean over labour markets (-2.915)
3) (age minus 15)I10; age in years
4) value: 0 a basic; 1 L extended basic; 2~ intennediate22
Two variables measure the differential eHed ol labour market conditbns on the transition rates of
various pnwps. This effeà is assumed to be equal for ap occupations28~ The sign of both coefficients
is as would be expeded. An increase in ihe number ot vacandes per job seeker ralses the transitbn
rate oi non-natives more than that of natives and reduces the iransilion rate of job seekers with an
intermediate level of educatbn compared to those wilh less educatbn. This also oonfirms my second
hypothesis. However, the latter effed is only weakly signi(icant. To Glustrate the implicatbns of these
resuits t have Ilsted the estimated effects of labour market coráltbns on the transitbn rates for some
groups of job seekers in Table 5.
Table 5 The coefficient of In (vacanGesljob seekers) per occupatbn for selected proups of job
seekers~~
basic education basic education intennediate education
native non-native native
truck drivers 0.35 0.92 0.11
unskilled production workers 0.11 0.68 -0.13
construction workers 0.30 0.87 0.06
skilled production workers 0.53 1.10 0.29
eledricians 0.97 1.54 0.73
supervising produdbn workers 0.82 1.39 0.58
intermediate technical statt 0.90 1.47 0.66
1) based on the Coetticients estimated wNhout unotuerved heterogeneity
For job seekers with the strongest position, and natives wfth an intermediate education level, the
etteds of labour maricet conditbns are tar less. For the transitbn rate to jobs such as unskilled produc-
tion worker the effect is even negative. Atthough this effed is insignifiCant, it Can be ratbnalised: if the
prospects of getting a higher ranked "pb deterbrate sutticiently then job seekers react by accepting
otters they would have rejected before. This ettect on the transitbn rate can ottset the eifect of a
reduced number ot job otters.
A clear pattem is revealed. Forjob seekers wilh the weakest labour market position, non-natives with
oNy a basic educatbn level, a deterioration of labour market conditbns greatly affects the transition
rates, even to low ranked 'pbs such as unskilled pn~ductbn vrorker. For those who adhere to the dual
labour market hypothesis, unskilled production workers probably bebng to the secondary segment.
Dickens and Lang stress that the important difference between the segments is that jobs are rationed
in the primary segments only.27t These resufts suggest that for non-natives even jobs in the
secondary segment can be ratbned.
~ A likelihood ratá test reveals that the implied restrictbns on the coefficients canrat be rejeded.
Tr Didcens and Lang (1985).23
For reasons stated betore urabserved heterogeneity amorq labour markets fs only albwed for labour
market corWitions in general and rwt tor its cross-proàwY with other variables. As fs the case tor the
general modelo( Sedbn 4, the coeflicierrts and the standard ertors of aN coei(icierRS, aparl from those
forthe number of vacancies per job seeker and the intercept, arB haniy affeded by the irttroduction of
market spedfic error terms. Therelore, onlythe lattercoetfbientswMh thefr standard enors are listed in
Table 8. Again the estimated coetticients remain more or less unaffeded, while their standard errors
increase substanlially. This increase is less than for estimatfon resulls reported in Section 4.
Eledricians and intermediate technical statt seem to be exceptions to this rule. However, these
exceptions are due tothe limëed numbers firWk~g ajob inthese occupations.
Table 6 Comparison of the estimatbn resutts with and withoul unobserved heterogeneity between
markets
with heterogeneity without heterogeneity
intercept~~ In(UN)ZI a intercept~l In(UN)2~
unskilled produdion workers3~ -3.51 -0.024 0.36 -3.53 0.11
(0.26) (0.23) (0.23) (0.12)
construdbn workers -3.42 0.36 0.16 -3.44 0.30
(0.23) (0.16) (0.22) (0.11)
truck drivers -3.34 0.43 0.095 -3.28 0.35
(0.18) (0.14) (0.18) (0.096)
skilled produdion workers -3.36 0.39 0.14 -3.36 0.53
(0.17) (0.13) (0.16) (0.094)
supervising produdion workers too few observations -8.66 0.82
(0.82) (0.24)
eledricians -7.39 1.11 0.32 -7.15 0.97
(0.68) (0.41) (0.58) (0.15)
intermediate technical statt -8.36 1.62 0.52 -7.75 0.97
(1.14) (0.89) (0.78) (0.18)
1) corrected for endogenous sampling
2) compared to the mean value over labour markets (-2.915)
3) one labour market was kept out of the anaysís due to nobody tinding a job in that occupation in
the sample.24
6 CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence presented in Section 4 and 5 supports the idea that the iransition rates to
empbymerri for various groups of jub seekers are disproportbnatey effeded by flucluatbns in labour
markel condilbns. Excess supply affects the transitbn rates of bw qualdied job seekert more than
average. These resuMs hold forihe aggregate transdbn rate as weN as for oo~patàn specific transi-
tbn rates, in ihe sense that the rates tor higher ranlced ocCUpadons are more serkwsly affected lhan
those of bwer ranked oocupatbns. 7his implies that Job seekers get better jobs durirg the upswing
than during the downswing.
These tindings fit into effblency wage models where wages are stidcy in ihe case of excess supply so
that the labour market has to react to fluctuatbns in aggregate demand by adjusting quantities and rat
wages. These findings do not Imply that there can be no relative wage adjustments at ail. But as long
as empbyers set wages within an occupatbn irrespective ot the type of job seeker applying for the
vacancy, excess supply will make employers more choosy. The oniyforoe which would stop them from
doing so wouki be a rise in the wage differentials within an occ,upatbn, so that they have to pay for
increasing theirqual'rfication standards.~l
The empirical results show ihat non-natives suffer the most from the increased selectivity during the
downswing. This is in accordance with the etticiency wage model. Assume that employers for some
reason or arather díslike empbying ran-natives. In a competilrve market there is a price for expressing
these preferences: the wages of non-natives will tend to be bebw the wages of natives. Those
empbyers whose discriminatory preferences are the weakest will employ non-natives, resufting in a
lower wage bill.
It there is excess supply ot labour, and wages are kept from falling by the existence of an efficiency
wage, this mechanism breaks down. Jobs are ratbned and empbyerscan seleá theirfavourite candi-
dates without having to pay surplus wages. In this case discrimination is costless.
This reasoning implies that the high unempbymeM among non-natives does rat have to be caused
by bw productivfty. On the contrary, ihe fad that the positbn of non-natives deteriorates relative to
that of natives during the downswing of the cyGe suggests that strong preferences against non-
natives are only expressed when there are ra costs involved.
~ Compare the models of Mortensen (1970) and Lippman arxf McCall (1976), page 185.25
Appendix
For cornenierxe I rewrite equatbn (19) in matrix notation:
Y-X!ltVtW
where (dimension between bradcets):
v - [c4,..... áK 1 (~L)
x - [q,,....qK 1 (~~)
X - [ lK , X ] (KXZ)
n -~~~a~ (2xK)
v - [v,....vK ] (~L)
E(V) - 0
KE~VV~-~ (~L)
W - ~w,...wK J (~L)
E(W) - 0
E[vec(W)vec(W) ] - Q
with:
Q - var(vec(n)~X,V)
K~ the number of labour markets
L z ihe dimension oi the vectors ak, a, and a
ak ,~, a, vk and wk are defined before in the tezt.
(KLxKL)
The matrác Q is the covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimates of the elemerris of Y, which
resuRs from the estimatán of model (18) in the text. So we havó an estimate of t).
In add'Rion we make the tolbwing assumptbns:
E~VX~ - 0 (~a)26
E~WX~ - 0 (~b1
E~VW~ - 0 (~c)
The assumptions (1a) and (1b) are standard in regressbn analysis. Assumptbn (1b) folbws from the
model speciticatbn: W is asymptotically a Iinear fundbn ot the stochastic componeM in individual
behavbur conditbnal on the labour market s~pecrtic ernxterms. The latter are covered by V.
Now let S be the L x L matrix detined by:
S - Yrl- XtXX~ ~X ~Y~Y~MY (2)
The main diagonal of S contains the sum of squared resi~als of the regression for each element of ~,
the of1 diagonal elements retlect the correlation of the residuals tor iwo different elemenis ot
Substituting for (1) and taking expedatbns gives:
E(S) -(K - 2)E t J~(t] ~ M)J
where:
M-~ rKrK ~ t~ M
J-I~~GK
and where A'B denotes the piecewise or Hadamard product of 1wo matrices.
Altemativey, ihe i,j-th elemenl of J'(Q'J~J can be written as tr(4,jM),
where:
Qy represents the i,j-th K x Kbbdc ot Q.
From (3) a consistent estimate of E can be derived:
ffi-
(3)
~- K' 2 LS
- J~O ~ M)J] (4)
where a" above a symbol denotes ils estimator. f~ow we have estimates of E and Q so we can derive
the variance matrix o( V t W, which will be deraled A. This variance matrix can be used to estimate (1)
by GLS.
vec~i[~ - (XA-'X~-'XA-'vec(y) (5)
varfvec~il~1 - ~XA-'X~-~ (6)
where:x-i~~x
n-È~i~tó
The esGmator of E, see equatán (4), is equal to the dáferer~ce of two matrices, whfch are both positive
definite. However, there is no guarantee that the dilferenCe betMreen both matrices is posflive defir)ite
too, afthouyh this is a requirement for E. AsympbtiCelly there vviN be rq prol~lems, unless the model is
mis-specMled.28
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